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Abstract. Why was Greimas’ theoretical proposal so divisive? Why did his disciples 
worship the new analytical method, while his detractors harshly rejected it? Th e article 
claims that the strength, as well as the weakness, of Greimassian semiotics consists in 
positing a rational way to determine the range of meanings of a text. Semiotic interpretive 
methods that are more aware of the diachronic dimension, such as Eco’s interpretive 
semiotics or Lotman’s semiotics of culture, infl ect this view by anchoring the rationality of 
interpretation to the reasonableness of a community of interpreters that is, by defi nition, 
changing over time. Th e article claims that, on the one hand, Greimas’ theoretical stance 
is in line with the predominant ‘culture of meaning’ distilled by the Western civilization 
from the Greeks until the Enlightenment, stressing the value of truth as correspondence 
between textual evidence and its hermeneutics. On the other hand, the article also 
suggests that Eco’s and Lotman’s insistence on the dynamic character of hermeneutic 
communities entails a politics of meaning meant to preserve the core of the Western 
‘semiotic civilization’ against threats that aim at deeply subverting it from both the inside 
or the outside of the semiosphere.
Keywords: Algirdas Greimas; Umberto Eco; Juri Lotman; interpretation; meaning; 
semiotics; Western civilization
“La civilisation n’est autre chose que le mode de végétation propre à l’humanité.”
(Victor Hugo, Œuvres complètes 4: 495–496)
1. Introduction
Th ere is no better way of honouring a scholar than critically assessing and prolonging his 
or her work. Unfortunately, Greimas’ theory was so compelling that it attracted both the 
best minds of his generation as well as the most intellectually subservient ones. Several 
decades aft er Greimas’ passing away, the frenzy fi rst generated by the novelty of his 
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method long gone, it is time not only to re-evaluate structural and generative semiotics 
but also to defend it: in recent years, semiotics-bashing has become a popular sport, 
mostly performed through cliché arguments and very little knowledge of semiotics 
itself. Even the most authoritative critics of semiotics have oft en thrown out the baby 
with the bathwater (Leone 2014: 2–3).
Th ere is only one serious way of talking about Greimas’ contributions to semiotics, 
and it is to read, re-read, and comment on his texts, better if perused in the original 
French. Th e prose of the Franco-Lithuanian scholar might seem abstruse to many, or 
old-fashioned in its rhetorical choices, yet it is more and more evident that what came 
aft er Greimas, and is now increasingly pervading both highbrow and lowbrow culture, 
is such a shallow combination of superfi cial cultural studies and, worse, conspiracy 
thought, that one can only be nostalgic about the glorious time of humanities in which 
scholars like Greimas still believed that a rational grasp of cultural and social facts 
could be attained through designing and applying a rigorous method (Leone 2017).
Nevertheless, the present paper does not encourage its readers to adopt a nostalgic 
gaze on Greimas and his semiotics as though they represented a golden age of human 
thought, now lost forever. On the contrary, the paper will claim that the best attitude 
to look at Greimas’ marvellous theoretical castle is vintage: contemporary semioticians 
should understand the principles of the internal harmony of Greimas’ semiotics, 
pinpoint those elements that, like the wooden clogs of the 1970s or the shoulder pads 
of the 1980s, should never become fashionable again – not only because they are ugly, 
but also because they are impractical –, and select those elements that, instead, are sorely 
needed in the contemporary design of humanities. As the present paper will seek to 
demonstrate, one of them is particularly precious: rational enthusiasm.
No “vintage” assessment and refashioning, however, will ever be possible without 
a merciless critical assessment of Greimas’ foundational texts. It is a pity that they 
are not read anymore as they deserve, partly because the mindset that they express 
is now dangerously out of fashion, partly because they are badly or poorly translated 
or not translated at all, and partially and mostly because they are too oft en diluted in 
companions and handbooks that transmit the superfi cial charm of Greimas’ theory but 
not its fundamentals. What follows is a critical analysis of the foundations of Greimas’ 
semiotic theory, which were fi rst laid with the publication of Sémantique structurale: 
recherche et méthode published in 1966 by the prestigious French publisher Larousse 
[the (more cautious) title of the 1983 English translation is Structural Semantics: An 
Attempt at a Method].
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2. Reality and signifi cation in Greimas
In a section entitled “Signifi cation and the human sciences” Greimas (1983[1966]: 1) 
writes that “[...] if the natural sciences ask questions in order to understand how man 
and the world are, the human sciences pose the question, more or less explicitly, of what 
both of them signify”. Th is sentence posits a neat separation between knowledge of the 
being of reality and knowledge of the signifi cation of reality. Th at could be regarded as a 
postulate of Greimas’ semiotics. Indeed, both his own works and those of his followers 
tend to “de-ontologize” semiotics drastically, reframing and deconstructing in structural 
terms any possible indentation of ‘reality’ into ‘language’. For Greimas and his school, 
reality might well exist, but it is not semiotically relevant, unless it is translated into 
semiotic forms, that is, into patterns of signifi cation.
Th e way in which Greimas approached the issue of images and their capacity to 
“represent reality” is the most effi  cacious example of such attitude. As the Franco-
Lithuanian semiotician pointed out in the essay “Sémiotique fi gurative et sémiotique 
plastique” [“Figurative semiotics and plastic semiotics”; 1984], images do not represent 
reality; admitting that would mean tainting the immanence of the semiotic meta-
language with a reference to the ontological dimension. Instead, Greimas contends 
that images are “visual texts” that refer to the articulation of the semantic plane of 
the “macro-semiotics of the world” in order to shape the articulation of their own 
expressive plane. In simpler words, and with an example, we do not recognize grapes in 
Caravaggio’s Basket of Fruit because the painting faithfully represents reality, but because 
it skillfully refers to the semantic articulation of fruit in most Western European visual 
culture in order to construct its own expressive plane though the usage of the appropriate 
plastic formants (lines, colours, and positions). For Greimas, then, images do not depict 
reality but the semiotic appraisal of it that circulates in a given cultural context.
An even more macroscopic example of Greimas’ attitude of de-ontologization is his 
treatment of time. As it is well known, most of the disagreement between Greimas and 
Paul Ricoeur stemmed from the fact that, whereas for the French philosopher narratives 
are one of the most powerful means though which human beings account for time, 
for the Franco-Lithuanian semiotician, time does not matter as much as temporality, 
that is, the illusion of a temporal dimension that, again, texts and narratives construct 
through their internal dynamics, whose analysis should therefore be independent from 
any preoccupation about the ontology of time (Greimas, Ricoeur 2000).
3. Greimas’ rationality and Eco’s reasonableness
Some exponents of the Greimassian school have radicalized the immanentism of 
structuralist, and especially generative, semiotics to an unbearable extent, translating 
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any potential reference to an extra-textual reality into the inner labyrinth of the theory. 
Th e philosophical purposes of this attitude, however, were clear to Greimas and, to a 
certain extent, were also perfectly understandable and laudable in the context of 20th-
century humanities. Greimas used to summarize such an attitude with the saying “hors 
du texte, point de salut”, [“outside of the text, there is no salvation”], paraphrasing the 
famous theological sentence “extra ecclesiam nulla salus” [“outside of the church there 
is no salvation”] contained in the catechism of the Catholic Church and attributed to 
the 3rd-century bishop Cyprian of Carthage.
Greimas was thus attached to the idea that semiotics should deal with what is 
inside texts, and not with what is outside of them, for he believed that keeping faith 
to methodological immanentism was the only way to guarantee the rationality of 
interpretation. Talking about the meaning of texts as something that emanates from 
their inner structures and not as something that is attributed to them from the outside 
(by the psychology of the interpreter, by the interpretive tendencies that predominate 
in societies according to ethnicity, class, gender, etc., or according to reference to a 
reality supposed to exist outside of the text) was meant to preserve the rationality 
and, therefore, the inter-subjectivity of interpretation: how can an agreement about 
the meaning of something be reached, if this something is not seen as a structure, as 
a text, as a system that inherently forbids or discourages certain interpretations and 
encourages certain others, guiding the reader toward them?
On the one hand, Greimas’ ambition – prolonging, to a certain extent, that of 
previous structural students of narratives, such as Vladimir Propp – was that of 
providing a rational method to grasp meaning, not only in plain discourse but also 
and above all in the elaborate, duplicitous, and subtly ambiguous linguistic creations 
of literature. Th e high point of such ambition manifested itself in Greimas’ Maupassant 
(1975), a didactic exploit meant to display the utmost potentialities of the Greimassian 
method for the analysis of literary narratives.
On the other hand, such a project of rational description of meaning joined, also to 
a certain extent, that of Umberto Eco’s interpretive semiotics: in Eco too, the so-called 
intentio operis is central; readers who attentively decode a text should aim neither 
at their subjective reading of it (intentio lectoris) nor at the meaning that the author 
supposedly intended to instill in the text (intentio auctoris) – which is frequently, and 
especially in literature, radically diff erent from the actual meaning of the text; they 
should seek to seize, instead, the intentio operis of a text, that is, the way in which the 
text itself designs a “model reader” by encouraging or discouraging certain interpretive 
moves (Eco 1979). Drawing his philosophical semiotic framework from Peirce’s vision 
of the sign and semiosis rather than – like Greimas – from Saussure’s linguistics and, 
even more keenly, Hjelmslev’s glossematics, Eco’s proposal of a method for the inter-
subjectively sustainable interpretation of texts and narratives does not strictly claim 
to be a rational but a reasonable one.
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Th at is the main diff erence between Eco and Greimas, and that is also their strength 
or their weakness, depending on the point of view from which their divergences are 
observed. Eco does not doubt that a reasonable agreement can be found, within a 
community of interpreters, when seeking to determine the meaning of a text (Eco 
1990). Faithful to Peirce’s quite dynamic semiotic philosophy, however, Eco does not 
affi  rm that this agreement is a permanent one, eternally inscribed in the structure of a 
text like a Platonic idea. He suggests, on the contrary, that such reasonable agreement 
will essentially depend on the interpretive encyclopedia shared by the community 
of interpreters. Such encyclopedia is by defi nition mutable; Eco does not primarily 
focus on the causes and laws of such mutation, but aims at providing some abstract 
guidelines that, independently from the community and the text at stake, might guide 
the interpretive work of readers. From this point of view, Eco provides a sort of semiotic 
version of Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality, in which what matters 
is not prescribing the rationality of the content of communication but that of the empty 
framework in which such content is communicatively dealt with (Habermas 1987).
According to this perspective, moreover, Juri Lotman’s semiotics can be considered 
as a natural complement of Eco’s theory, since it precisely bears on the semiotic analysis 
of those socio-cultural dynamics that modify the communitarian setting in which a 
given interpretation takes place. Lotman does not focus on causes or on agencies of 
changes in the semiosphere either, but at least he envisages a systematic study of how 
the “environment of meaning” mutates over time (Lotman 1990).
Greimas disregards time. He does not contemplate that changes in the semiosphere 
will aff ect the ways in which readers interpret texts. His ambition is to propose not a 
reasonable, but a rational method for the analysis of meaning, which could be valid both 
cross-culturally and trans-historically. He does not want only to defi ne a framework 
in which interpreters would reasonably discuss the meaning of a text, like Eco, nor a 
dynamics that would aff ect the characteristics of this framework through time and 
space, like Lotman. Greimas wants to defi ne a text’s range of meaning, its immutably 
and inter-subjectively valid content, and its inherent voice. Th at is Greimas’ strength 
and charm, but also his weakness, and perhaps the ingredient that has made many of 
his texts age much faster than those of other, less ambitious, semioticians.
4. Relativizing Greimassian semiotics: trends and dangers
Perhaps as a reaction to or even as a provocation against the universalism of structural 
anthropology and generative semiotics, in the last decades, anthropological research 
has increasingly been focusing on the extreme variability of meaning. Moreover, such 
research has found out that, in the passage from culture to culture both in time and space 
(a robust school of historical anthropology has developed in parallel with socio-cultural 
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and mainly synchronic anthropology), it is not only meaning that changes but also the 
framework of meaning. On the one hand, semiotic anthropology has investigated the 
variety of linguistic and semiotic ideologies, that is, ways of conceiving the production, 
circulation, and also the destruction of meaning in society (including those semiotic 
ideologies that deny the existence of a separate dimension called ‘meaning’) (Silverstein 
1979; Silverstein, Urban 1996); on the other hand, certain trends of post-structural 
anthropology itself (Descola, for instance) have proposed that human groups vary 
even in the way in which they conceive the ontology of the world in which they live 
(Descola 2013). Hence, given the extreme variability of semiotic and even ontological 
ideologies, how is it still possible to maintain the universality of certain Greimassian 
theoretical ingredients and the corresponding analytical tools? How can one apply the 
semiotic square to the analysis of a non-Western and/or non-contemporary text, if the 
framework of meaning in which this text is usually read, for instance native American 
cosmologies, systematically disregards that principle of dialectic opposition on which 
the semiotic square is essentially based?
At the same time, as it was suggested earlier, one should not throw the baby out 
with the bathwater. First, while acknowledging the profound and sometimes extreme 
variety of ‘cultures of meaning’, the semiotic anthropologist should not give up the 
ambition of comparing cultures; by doing so, indeed, anthropology would turn into 
a poorly descriptive and quite sterile exercise, as it has been the case with too much 
recent post-colonial anthropology. Furthermore, such a theoretical stance would justify 
a fragmentary view of human culture, ignoring its lines of continuity and, what is worse, 
disintegrating any ground for a common ethics. In a world with no common framework 
for meaning, misunderstanding is the only option. Abstract semiotic models like the 
very articulate and powerful one developed by Greimas and his school should, therefore, 
be conceived not as a point of arrival but as a point of departure for comparative 
analysis, off ering a solid framework in relation to which contrasts could be observed 
and diff erences pinpointed.
To give an example: Greimas’ treatment of actors, time, and space in discourse 
is quite Cartesian. Meaning eff ects of discursive choices in the construction of 
these narrative coordinates are explained with reference to an abstract instance of 
enunciation, as though all narrative was the result of a projection of simulacra departing 
from this abstract point. While perfectly suitable for analysing actorial, temporal, and 
spatial structures in most Indo-European languages and narratives, this framework is 
incompatible with languages and cultures in which the articulation of space and time 
is radically diff erent from the Western one, for instance in cultures where the past is 
seen as something that spatially lies in front of the speakers, since it is already known, 
and not behind them (Leone 2014: 12–13). However, it cannot be denied that, in this 
case too, relying on the Greimassian theory of discourse and enunciation and realizing 
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that it does not properly capture the construction of space and time in some linguistic 
and semiotic cultures is an indispensable point of departure, since it provides a negative 
framework in contrast to which the specifi cities of even the most “exotic” semiotic 
ideology can be described, at least in relation to what it is not.
Second, admitting that the claimed universality of the Greimassian method is shaky 
when it is confronted with texts distant in time and space does not necessarily mean 
that it should be rejected or that more universal frameworks of meaning, yet to be 
elaborated, should replace it.
On the one hand, it can be deduced from such interpretive diffi  culties that semiotics, 
even the most abstract one, never grows outside of a specifi c culture of meaning. Greimas 
opened one of his most important books, Du Sens (1970), by saying that “it is extremely 
diffi  cult to speak about meaning and to say something meaningful about it” (Greimas 
1987[1970]: 7); he did not say: “it is diffi  cult to say something defi nitive about meaning”. 
No matter how the meta-language of the semiotician seeks to detach itself from the 
language-object that it analyses, such a meta-language will always stem from a precise 
“culture of meaning”, from a semiotic ideology that “contaminates” the designing of 
frameworks within which the rationality of a textual interpretation is gauged. Methods 
should, therefore, be considered in the same ways as Louis T. Hjelmslev (1961[1943]) 
would consider interpretations: even if they cannot be exhaustive, they can nevertheless 
be ranked. Greimas’ method, like any other method, cannot be completely immune 
from being biased: it was conceived within a specifi c meta-semiotic ideology. It is, 
however, much less biased and more encompassing than less ambitious frameworks 
of meaning. To give an example, it is certainly true that Greimas’ way of conceiving 
of narratives as essentially centred on an object of value longed for by a subject does 
not precisely adapt to narrative cultures that lack such a strong idea of ‘subject’ or do 
not defi ne it as a ‘chasing agent’; at the same time, it is also true that Greimas’ model 
is more abstract, fl exible, and, as a consequence, encompassing than Propp’s narrative 
framework, on which it elaborates.
On the other hand, while refi ning one’s awareness of the cultural specifi cities of 
one’s meta-language, one should not give in to the intellectual cliché that all biases 
are to be immediately condemned and discarded from the compass of the researcher. 
Th ere are no humanities without biases. Furthermore, in the humanities and perhaps 
also in social sciences, biases one is aware of are nothing but a manifestation of the 
point of view, as well as the specifi c interest, from which other cultures are observed, 
analysed, and interpreted. Th e idea that every interpretation should be in function of 
the ‘Other’, from the point of view of the ‘Other’, and in total obliviousness of one’s 
‘local knowledge’ is not only utopian but also, from a certain point of view, counter-
productive. It generates a paradoxical semiotic ideology according to which the only 
way to know the ‘Other’ is to forget oneself or, worse, to hide oneself behind a curtain 
of pseudo-neutrality.
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Th e desire to interpret texts should, indeed, never be detached from the awareness 
that such a desire enfolds in a conversation that links one’s cognitions, but also one’s 
emotions, with the idea of an audience. Semioticians, as well as anthropologists, do 
not interpret other cultures for an abstract, universal readership; they do so because 
they somehow anticipate the interpretive needs of a community to which they more or 
less belong, although in the guise of “outposts outside of the semiosphere”. Cultivating 
one’s biases means also refi ning the awareness that one’s interpretation stems from 
a community and for a community, although it seeks to reach out to distant worlds, 
times, and spaces.
5. Toward a politics of interpretation
Admitting the inevitability of biases entails a politics of interpretation. To return to 
Greimas’ structural semantics and the complex method that, on such premises, the 
Franco-Lithuanian semiotician developed all along his career, one might look at their 
specifi c biases not as something to be stigmatized and purged, but as something that hints 
at the specifi c interpretive community to which Greimas’ theory spoke and still speaks. 
Such a community essentially coincides with the “Western culture”, meant here as that 
complex ontological and semiotic ideology that emerged at the genesis of the Greek 
thought and culminated in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Entire libraries have 
been dedicated to describe the development, ramifi cations, and main characteristics of this 
huge and hugely infl uential tradition. Its features cannot be properly summarized or even 
hinted at in a single paper. One should at least underline, however, that a fundamental 
feature of the Western episteme becomes the centre of Greimas’ semiotic theory: the 
idea of truth. In Greimas, truth does not consist, like in most logic, in a correspondence 
between reality and representation, ontology and semiosis. As it was indicated at the onset 
of this paper, for Greimas, reality is an extra-semiotic element that should not intrude in 
the analysis of language. But truth is an essential idea in Greimassian semiotics as well 
in two even more fundamental regards.
First, Greimas’ generative path is articulated in such a way that the distinction 
between truth, secret, lie and falsity is inherent to it. ‘Truth’ is an eff ect of meaning 
largely independent from reality, yet this does not mean that it is independent from 
discourse too. In other words, Greimas seems to postulate that, within a text, it is 
always possible to determine rationally whether its structures convey a message of 
truth, disguise it under a secret, mask it in a lie, or subvert it as falsity. Truth is an eff ect 
of meaning that it would be impossible to grasp if the idea of a hierarchy of values of 
veridiction were not part of the epistemic background of structural semiotics. Not all 
cultures cherish the value of truth in the same way. Th e distinction between that which 
is and appears and that which is not and does not appear (truth/falsity), as well as the 
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distinction between that which is not but appears and that which is but does not appear 
(lie/secret) is not as sharp and does not confi gure such a stark hierarchy in all cultures 
of meaning. In certain oriental philosophies, for instance, such as some trends of Zen 
meditation, separating these four modalities of discursive veridiction is not as important 
as accepting their indistinctiveness, to the point that deconstructing the hierarchy of 
epistemic values even turns into the main goal of signifi cation.
Th e pre-eminence of truth in the ideological semiotics that gave rise to Greimas’ 
method is, instead, evident in the internal structure of its generative path as well as 
in the kind of conversation that the interpretations that Greimas and his followers 
have been producing thanks to this path implicitly entertain. As was underlined 
above, humanities inexorably utter their meta-discourse “for someone”, although 
they are not always necessarily aware of this (but they should). Th e “someone” for 
which the Greimassian semiotic theory has worked over the last fi ve decades can be 
variously defi ned, but it is certainly an abstract member of the community for which 
the distinction among a truthful interpretation, a false interpretation, a conspiracy 
theory, and a lie is essential. Greimas implicitly worked all his life for a community of 
interpreters to whom determining whether an interpretation is truthful or not – in the 
sense that it is more or less in keeping with the nature of the semio-linguistic features 
that are inter-subjectively attestable in discourse – crucially matters.
Th at is not always necessarily the case. One could easily think of contemporary 
non-Western cultures in which the effi  cacy of interpretation is, for instance, more 
important than its truthfulness (think about the way in which religious fundamentalists, 
for example, conceive of the hermeneutic work). But one could also easily conceive of 
a historical and anthropological development as a consequence of which the epistemic 
impulse given by the Greeks to the Western culture more than two millennia ago slowly 
but inexorably dwindles. One could imagine a scenario in which Western Europeans 
will not care anymore about truth as their ancestors did and will adhere, on the contrary, 
to an ontological and semiotic ideology of meaning in which, for instance, a Nietzschean 
idea of interpretation prevails, one in which the value of an interpretation is not a 
measure of its structural accuracy but a result of the rhetorical and sometimes even 
brutal force by which it is promoted.
It should not be forgotten that also the second pillar of the Western civilization, 
Jerusalem, underlined the importance of truth in one of its commandments, “do not 
lie”. Why is such a commandment there? Because in the Judeo-Christian civilization 
too, the prevailing ontological and semiotic ideology was such as to push forward a 
social scenario in which the members of a community can live together only if they 
at least constantly strive to be truthful, to treasure the correspondence between what 
they think, feel, see, and what they say, write, represent. Th e Judeo-Christian idea of 
the morality of presenting the truth to the world has complemented, in the history 
of the Western civilization, the Greek idea that the world has a truth to be presented.
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A sophisticated perspective on the history of the Western civilization, however, 
should suggest that such ethical and gnoseological pre-eminence of truth is not a 
biological feature of humanity but a long-term cultural choice, which could admit 
alternatives and be subverted. Semiotics inherently conceives of human beings as free 
agents, able to use their signs in order to lie as well as in order to tell the truth, or to 
combine both in various manners. Eco (1976: 7) famously defi ned semiotics as the 
“discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie”; he did not mean, 
though, that signs “must be used for lying”; they can be used for either telling the 
truth or lying. Nevertheless, at a meta-level, the epistemic freedom of human beings 
in relation to language – i.e., the fact that they are not bound to use signs as truthful 
signals as other animal species are but they can actually weave them to present an 
untruthful depiction of reality, or an untruthful interpretation of discourse – entails the 
possibility of diff erent epistemic ideologies. It entails, for instance, the possibility that a 
society can exist or develop in which lies are not only tolerated, but also encouraged; a 
society in which what matters is not the correspondence between discourse and reality 
or the harmony between discourse and interpretation but the effi  cacy of simulacra, 
their ability to grant their utterers a modality to “get by” among more or less confl icting 
relations in society, for instance.
6. The mutability of the communities of interpreters
Eco’s emphasis on the importance of the “community of interpreters” in a dynamic 
sense complements Greimas’ theoretical proposal in two ways: it points at the changing 
nature of interpretive frameworks and ideologies and, as a consequence, makes the 
urgency of a ‘politics of interpretation’ more cogent.
As it was pointed out earlier, unlike Greimas, Eco does not seek to provide a 
methodology for the rational determination of the content of a textual interpretation; 
he tries to outline the empty framework and the general rules for the reasonable 
interpretation of a text. Th at ultimately means that, while in Greimas, for instance, there 
is only one way in which the abstract narrative direction of a text can be seen as shaping 
its meaning – that is, a direction that fl ows from the contract between the sender and 
the subject to the sanction between the subject and the receiver –, in Eco, nothing 
intrinsically forbids the cultural evolution of a community slowly transforming this 
narrative standard to the point that, at some stage, the community actually considers as 
meaningful those narratives in which the hero is positively sanctioned by the receiver, 
because he or she did not attain the object of value or even voluntarily gave up the 
quest for it. 
To give an example, the evolution of new religious communities stemming and 
oft en violently departing from older ones oft en entails dramatic changes in the way 
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they construct not only meaning (for instance, the meaning of “sacred” texts), but also 
the “meaning of meaning”, (that is, the way in which they maintain that a sacred text 
should be read in order for it to transmit some cultural value to the community). In 
the contemporary religious world, as an increasing number of individuals is attracted 
by so-called “fundamentalism”, new communities are shaped around the idea that 
sacred texts – which these new communities apparently share with non-fundamentalist 
communities – should be read in a completely diff erent way in order for them to exude 
that meaning which will subsequently inform the entire life of the community at every 
level, from the regulation of fi nance to sexual behaviours.
From the point of view of Greimassian semiotics, one could argue that these 
fundamentalist interpretations of sacred texts are wrong or, at least, that they are poorer 
than mainstream interpretations, since they do not adopt a rational method in order 
to pair the expressive plane of these texts with what they are supposed to mean. For 
instance, for Greimas and his school, as well as for most mainstream interpreters of 
sacred and non-sacred texts, the syntagmatic continuity of discourse must be taken into 
account when determining its meaning; the fact that a lexeme comes before or aft er 
another lexeme is an essential component of the intentio operis of the text, suggesting 
readers how to pinpoint its proposal of signifi cation. In a fundamentalist reading, 
instead, the rationality of this very basic interpretive rule is subverted; excerpts are 
detached from the syntagmatic chain of the text and rearranged in the interpretation 
without particular attention to the original disposition of the elements; such work of 
textual bricolage, which allows the interpreter, for instance, to put together “quotations” 
whose ingredients do not actually belong to the same textual location, is evidently 
irrational in Greimassian terms. But is it also unreasonable in Eco’s terms?
It is, of course, unreasonable, but only to the extent to which a community of 
interpreters holds it as such. In other words, it is unreasonable to cherry-pick words 
or sentences from the continuity of a text in order to set them together into pseudo-
citations that supposedly reveal the meaning of the text and declare its stance and 
guidance as regards a certain aspect of social life, if and only if the semiotic ideology 
of the community perceives that the integrity of the text as it has been composed 
by the author or recomposed by a rigorous philological tradition is a hierarchically 
superior value in the community. But what if, under the pressure of alternative semiotic 
ideologies and, therefore, models of meaning and methods of interpretation, slowly 
but inexorably a community starts to fi nd it more reasonable to obtain a pragmatic 
eff ect through the manipulation of a text than to remain faithful to its original syntactic 
construction? What if a rhapsodic, transient, and “bricoleuse” textual ideology ends up 
diminishing the value of textual integrity?
To a certain extent, such devaluation of philological accurateness is already gaining 
momentum and space in the Western semiosphere as a consequence of its revolution 
in terms of the technology of communication. Today more than ever, interpreters 
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can decompose not only a verbal text but also an image or a video and reassemble it 
at their will, producing new physical signifi ers to be interpreted globally. On the one 
hand, the easiness with which the texts circulating in the digital semiosphere can be 
decomposed and recomposed allows interpreters to access a degree of freedom and 
creativity that would have been impossible under the previous technical conditions. On 
the other hand, though, technical possibilities are transforming the prevailing textual 
ideology, replacing it with one in which what a text is becomes less important than 
what a text is used for.
Th e predominance of strategic pragmatics over philological syntax is undermining 
and subverting one of the pillars of the interpretive framework emphasizing the 
reasonable character of which Eco spent most of his intellectual prestige: the diff erence 
between interpretation and use (Eco 1990). In other words, while not prescribing rigid 
rules for the rational defi nition of the meaning of a text like Greimas, Eco considered 
it fundamental for the reasonableness of the social exercise of interpretation in the 
Western world that such a diff erence between how texts materially are and what readers 
want to achieve through their interpretation be maintained and preserved. Eco probably 
did not believe that this standard of interpretive reasonableness was universal. Being 
not only a semiotician but also a historian, he knew perfectly well that semiospheres, 
with their textual, semiotic, and even ontological ideologies, are subject to change due 
to external forces that want to subvert and replace them; he knew the Middle Ages too 
well (and perhaps he studied the period exactly for this reason) to ignore that, in certain 
historical epochs, “barbarians” arrive, and it is not only folkloristic destruction that 
they bring; they bring, instead, a new interpretive community that disrupts the older 
criteria of reasonable interpretation. During the Middle Ages, unfl agging monasteries 
preserved not only manuscripts but also the very abstract idea of textual integrity, 
allowing the continuity of the Western civilization between the classical epoch and 
the Renaissance. Such historical continuity was also an ideological one: despite the 
fact that our interpretation of texts is in many cases radically diff erent from that of 
the ancient Greeks, our way of distinguishing between what is reasonable and what 
is unreasonable concerning a text is essentially the same, and it was handed down 
from the Greeks and the Jews and subsequently the Christians to us because it was 
preserved as an irreplaceable value. If, today, we consider – as Aristotle would in his 
time – that the meaning of a text can be obtained only by considering the integrality 
and the integrity of the text, and not through its capricious excision, we also owe it to 
the fact that this textual mindset was placed at the core of the Western semiosphere 
and defended against external attacks.
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7. Waiting for the semiotic “barbarians”
Does this mean a “clash of civilizations” exists? Does it mean that a “Western civilization” 
exists? Does it mean that it must be defended from “attacks” coming from diff erent 
civilizations? From a semiotic perspective, these questions make sense only if the notion 
of ‘civilization’ itself is deconstructed and reconstructed in semiotic terms. If by ‘Western 
civilization’ one means a certain way of conceiving of the relation between reality and 
signifi cation; a certain way of construing the ‘meaning of meaning’; and, above all, a 
certain way of positing the exercise of textual interpretation as a means to retrieve the 
meaning of a signifying reality, then ‘Western civilization’ certainly exists. Moreover, 
that entails that other civilizations also exist as adoptions of diff erent ontological, 
semiotic, and textual ideologies.
Being defi ned as a conceptual semiosphere, ‘Western civilization’ marks its 
boundaries through diff erent means. Th e geographical frontiers of this semiosphere 
are not perhaps the most fundamental ones but they are, nevertheless, among the series 
of signs that concretize the threshold between what is inside and what is outside. In 
other words, it is not suffi  cient for an interpreter to be located in France to guarantee 
that his or her interpretation will actually adhere to the standards of reasonable handling 
of texts that characterizes the Western civilization. At the same time, France is what it 
is exactly because its geographical boundaries more or less coincide with those of an 
interpretive community for which a given set of interpretive standards and criteria are 
considered as valuable and even binding.
It would be meaningless to ignore the geographical nature of interpretive 
communities: for a long time in human history, communication has been based 
on physical proximity; and even now, in an era in which it is tremendously easy to 
communicate and establish communities with individuals that do not share our own 
geographical space at all, the fact of occupying the same portion of physical territory 
still is a fundamental ingredient of most communities. Th is is the reason for which the 
Western civilization is not only what is marked by precise geographical boundaries – 
although these are constantly renegotiated through communication or fi ght – but it 
also is that geographical space. Being born in Europe means coming to the world in 
a geography with a precise history as regards the ontological, semiotic, and textual 
ideologies that have prevailed in this space over a long period.
Yet it would be equally meaningless to think that defending ‘Western civilization’ 
exclusively means protecting its geographical boundaries. Th e geographical boundaries 
of a civilization must be protected not only because they physically outline a space but 
also, and more fundamentally, because, in many cases, they are the concretization of 
ideological boundaries. Geographical and ideological boundaries, however, do not 
always coincide. Unfortunately, the “enemies of the Western civilization” are not only 
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beyond its geographical frontiers. Th ey are also inside of them, thriving within its 
geographical space while ideologically exerting a centrifugal, disruptive agency.
Pinpointing the ultimate nature of the “clash of civilizations” comes down to the 
question: who are our “barbarians”? During the Middle Ages, it was clear that the 
barbarians were those whose political aims entailed also the destruction of the European 
Judeo-Christian cultural heritage, which was, therefore, protected through strategies 
of isolation and reproduction of the core texts of the civilization under attack. Th e 
“barbarians” that, today, seek to undermine the foundations of the Western civilization 
cannot be primarily conceived in geographic terms, although, as it was pointed out 
above, a civilization is also embodied by the physical space that it occupies. On the 
opposite, it is in abstract semiotic terms that the current “barbarians” must be defi ned.
If the “Western civilization” is that in which a community of interpreters active 
over several millennia painfully selected, as its core interpretive habits, the standards 
that allow the members of the community to determine what is true and what is false, 
what interpretation is coherent with the text and what is not, how the limits of a textual 
unit should be considered and preserved and how, to the contrary, the textual integrity 
of discourse is dismantled and disrupted, then the “barbarians”, that is, the enemies 
of such civilization are not necessarily ‘eastern’, or ‘non-Christian’, or ‘non-Jewish’, 
but all those who, being geographically united into diff erent physical communities 
outside of the Western semiosphere or seeking to undermine it ideologically from 
the inside, intentionally or unintentionally operate so that, under their continuous 
collective pressure, the geographical space of the Western civilization comes to adopt 
an alternative ontological, semiotic, and textual ideology, producing eff ects of meaning 
and, above all, relations among members in a completely diff erent way.
To give an example, Islamic fundamentalists certainly are “barbarians”, for they 
aim at injecting more and more ideas of truth, meaning, and text into the European 
civilization that are completely at odds with that which the civilization has singled 
out over the centuries of its history as its core semiotic standards of reasonable 
interpretation. ISIS represents the barbaric counterpart of Europe not only because it 
disregards the rule of law, but also, and perhaps more disquietingly, because it seeks 
to destroy the semiotic ideology that underlies such rule of law, a semiotic ideology 
that, for instance, considers that a certain degree of certainty in adjudication can be 
reached only when unbiased witnesses are taken into account (the idea that the rape 
of a woman must be attested by four male witnesses, for example, is against in the 
Western legal civilization but is also, and even more fundamentally, against the Western 
semiotic civilization).
Nevertheless, Western civilization is threatened not only by the “barbarians out 
there”, but also by individuals and groups that could be defi ned as “barbarians inside” 
(inside the semiosphere of Western civilization). A long, painful, and oft en bloody 
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history has brought about in the West the idea that being civilized means determining 
and respecting the “human rights” but also, even more fundamentally, determining 
and respecting the “semiotic rights”. Paul Grice’s (1975) conversational maxims are 
an example of the attempt to distill these rights into a tremendously concise form. 
Even more generally, a fundamental “semiotic right” that the Western civilization has 
learned to place at the centre of its semiosphere is the idea that there should be a certain 
amount of correspondence between what a participant in a conversation thinks and 
what this participant says in the conversation. It is not diffi  cult, however, to imagine an 
evolution of the Western semiotic civilization that will result not only in the prevailing 
of fundamentalist hermeneutics but also of trolling hermeneutics, that is, of a semiotic 
ideology in which the correspondence between the signifi ed thought and the signifying 
word is less important than the fun to be had from witnessing the disruption of the 
conversation and from actually contributing to it. Or one may equally well witness the 
rise of a semiotic civilization of conspiracy, in which, again, the aesthetic pleasure of 
detecting secret plots beyond any socio-political phenomena will be more important 
than gathering coherent evidence supporting one’s interpretation of facts.
Conclusion
Greimas’ gigantic eff orts to elaborate a theory and a method able to determine 
rationally the meaning of texts might well be regarded as outmoded nowadays, given 
the proliferation of alternative textual ideologies and, above all, given the increasing 
affi  rmation of a semiotic ideology according to which discrepant hermeneutics can 
coexist in a community of interpreters. Yet accepting this relativization of Greimas 
would be tantamount to ignoring that, behind his method, there is a long and complex 
history through whose painful vicissitudes a certain idea of text and interpretation 
became fundamental in the Western world. Th e historical forces that led Greimas 
to envisage his complex and powerful theory are the same ones that allow a judge to 
choose among diff erent interpretations of facts and make this choice inter-subjectively 
viable for all the members of the same legal conversation. If one rejects Greimas – not 
as concerns the details of his theoretical creation, but as regards the overall spirit that 
animates it – then one rejects an important, perhaps a defi nitional ingredient of the 
Western semiotic civilization, the ingredient according to which meaning is not created 
through force, but through communication, through rules and not through violence.
On the other hand, Eco’s theory of semiotics is there to warn us all about the fact 
that what Greimas considered as the only possible rational method of interpretation 
is actually the result of what a community of interpreters has come to recognize and 
actually defend for a long time as a reasonable framework for signifi cation. In other 
words, Greimas tells us what the meaning of texts is, whereas Eco tells us what the 
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meaning of texts should be, suggesting that the semiotic ideology of the Western 
civilization is binding also and above all by virtue of the historical process that resulted 
in its triumph.
We might abandon ourselves to the currents of history, and think that, no matter 
what we do or say, the semiosphere will eventually shape itself according to mysterious, 
unfathomable laws. We might fatalistically accept that, for instance, one day we shall 
lose the meaning of ‘truth’ as this idea had been conceived from the Greeks until 
Greimas. But that is not the message of most 20th-century semiotics. Greimas, Eco, 
and also Lotman implicitly suggested that what we do and say will actually shape the 
semiosphere and that we should therefore take responsibility for the maintenance of the 
semiotic core that lies at the centre of the Western civilization. If a clash of civilizations 
exists, it exists above all in the form of continuous tension among diff erent ways of 
conceiving of meaning, including the way that eliminates the very idea of meaning from 
the human horizon. If we think that this idea is important, because it is nothing but 
the counterpart of the ethical idea of freedom, then not only does a clash of semiotic 
civilizations exist, but it should also give rise to a continuous battle for the defense of 
the Western conception of meaning.
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Столкновение семиотических цивилизаций
Почему теоретические выводы Греймаса вызывали столько разночтений? Почему 
последователи Греймаса восхищались его новым аналитическим методом, а критики 
резко отвергали? Автор статьи считает, что и сила, и слабость греймасовской семиотики 
заключаются в том, что Греймас предлагает рациональный способ определения диапазона 
значений текста. Семиотические методы интерпретации, учитывающие диахроническое 
измерение, как, например, интерпретирующая семиотика Умберто Эко или семиотика 
культуры Юрия Лотмана, углубляют это представление, привязывая рациональность 
интерпретации к изменяющемуся во времени common sense сообщества интерпретаторов. 
По мнению автора статьи, теоретическая позиция Греймаса, с одной стороны, созвучна 
преобладающей «культуре значения» западной цивилизации – от греков до Просвещения, 
подчеркивающей ценность истины как соответствия между текстовыми доказательствами 
и их герменевтикой. С другой стороны, в настойчивом подчеркивании Эко и Лотманом 
динамического характера интерпретационных сообществ скрывается политика смысла, 
цель которой – сохранить ядро западной «семиотической цивилизации» от угроз как 
изнутри семиосферы, так и извне.
Semiootiliste tsivilisatsioonide kokkupõrge 
Miks tekitasid Greimase teoreetilised ettepanekud selliseid lahkarvamusi? Miks kummardasid 
tema jüngrid uut analüütilist meetodit, kuid kriitikud lükkasid selle otsustavalt kõrvale? 
Artiklis väidetakse, et nii Greimase semiootika tugevus kui ka selle nõrkus seisnevad selles, 
et ta pakkus välja ratsionaalse meetodi, määratlemaks teksti tähenduste ulatust. Semiootilised 
tõlgendusmeetodid, mis on teadlikumad diakroonilisest mõõtmest, nagu näiteks Eco 
interpretatsiooniteooria või Lotmani kultuurisemiootika, moduleerivad seda seisukohta, sidudes 
tõlgenduse ratsionaalsuse tõlgendajate kogukonna ajas muutuva mõistuspärasusega. Autori väitel 
on Greimase teoreetiline seisukoht ühelt poolt kooskõlas domineeriva “tähenduskultuuriga”, mille 
läänelik tsivilisatsioon on destilleerinud alates kreeklastest kuni valgustusajani, rõhutades tõe 
väärtust kui vastavust tekstipõhise tõendusmaterjali ja selle hermeneutika vahel. Teisalt osutatakse 
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artiklis, et hermeneutiliste kogukondade dünaamilise iseloomu järjekindlas rõhutamises Eco 
ja Lotmani poolt peitub tähenduspoliitika, mille eesmärgiks on kaitsta lääneliku “semiootilise 
tsivilisatsiooni” tuuma ohtude eest, mis üritavad seda õõnestada nii semiosfääri sees kui ka 
väljaspool seda.
